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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,

No. 8375

vs.

CASE

CHESTER MATHIS,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT
On June 18, 19 57, appellant was con vic ted of
a crime in the District Court of Salt Lake County and
sentenced to a term in the State prison (R 93). From
the verdict and judgment rendered thereon, appellant
appeals to this court and assigns the following:

1. Error of the Court in granting the State a
continuance without a showing as provided by law.
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2. Error of the Court in over-ruling appellant's
objection to the impanelling of the jury.
3. Error of the Court in over-ruling appellant's
objection to the introduction of testimony.
4. Error of the Court in denying appellant's
motion in arrest of judgment.
To sustain this appeal and reverse the judgment,
the appellant relies on the folowing:

PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
I
DUE PROCESS OF LAW MEANS, THE PROCEDURE
PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THE TRIAL
OF ACTIONS.
Henderson vs. State, 126 P. 840

II
WHEN A CRIMINAL ACTION IS CALLED FOR TRIAL
IN UTAH, NO CONTINUANCE MAY BE HAD EXCEPT UPON A SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE BY
AFFIDAVIT.
Sections 11 and 12, Article I, U tab Constitution
Section 1, 14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution
Section 77-29-1 Utah Code, 1953
Section 77-24-18 Utah Code, 1953
State vs. Hartman, 119 P2 112
Finnely vs. State, 228 P 1003
State vs. Williams, 163 P 1104
In Re Begerow, 65 P 828
Arrowsmith vs. State, 175 SW 545
Logan vs. State, 234 SW 493
People vs. Buckley, 47 P 1009
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III
A VOLUNTARY FISHING TRIP ON THE PART OF
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN A CRIMINAL CASE
IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR DELAYING THE TRIAL.
State vs. Fairclough, 44 P2 692
State vs. Taylor, 207 P 746
In Re: Begerow, 65 P. 828
Hernandez vs. State, 11 P2 35 6
Neven vs. Nev-en, 154 P 78
State vs. Keefe, 98 P 122
State vs. Freshwater, 85 P 447
State vs. Williams, 163 P 1104
State vs. Brewer, 158 P 1094
Arrowsmith vs. State, 175 SW 545
People vs. Flynn, 26 P 1114
Musgraves vs. State, 106 P 544

ARGUMENT
I
DUE PROCESS OF LAW MEANS, THE PROCEDURE
PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THE TRIAL
OF ACTIONS.

In Henderson vs. State, due process is defined by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court as follows:
"In criminal cases in a State Court due process of law means a trial in a court of competent
jurisdiction before an impartial judge and jury,
or before a judge alone, upon an accusation,
either by indictment or information, as the State
may provide, charging the accused of the violation of some State law, of which accusation the
accused must have notice in time to enable him
to prepare for trial. The trial must proceed
according to the established procedure or rules
of practice in such State applicable to all such

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

cases.''
To elaborate further upon this question would be
a reflection upon the intelligence of this Court, so we
proceed to a consideration of the main problems.

II
WHEN A CRIMINAL ACTION IS CALLED FOR TRIAL
IN UTAH, NO CONTINUANCE MAY BE HAD EXCEPT UPON A SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE BY
AFFIDAVIT.

The substantive question presented by this appeal, is that appellant's conviction was obtained by
violating his constitutional rights.
On May 17, 19 57, appellant was duly arraigned
on an information charging him with a crime, to
which he entered his plea of not guilty, and trial was
set for June 11th to follow in order (R 6). Thereafter
on May 21, the Clerk of the Court set the trial for
June 5th at 10 o'clock A.M. and notified the respective parties thereof, pursuant to the rules of the Court.
On June 4th, a supeona was issued for State witnesses and the sheriffs return shows that this supeona
was recalled (R 7).
On June 5th at 10 o'clock A.M., appellant appeared in Court with his counsel ready for trial, and
the prosecuting attorney appeared and orally moved
the court for a continuance stating that the complaining witness was in Yellowstone Park. No showing of any kind was made or offered by affidavit or otherwise, to which motion the appellant
objected. The appellant's objection was over-ruled,
and the state's motion for a continuance granted
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(R 8).
On June 18, the case was again called for trial
at which time the appellant objected to the impanelling
of the jury, which objection was over-ruled by the
Court (R 12).
After the jury had been impanneled, appellant
objected to the taking of any testimony, which objection was over-ruled (R 14). At 4:25 P.M., that
same day, the jury returned its verdict finding the appellant guilty (R 10).
On June 21st, appellant filed his motion in arrest
of judgment (R 110), which motion was overruled,
and appellant sentenced to a term in prision (R Ill).
Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution
provides, in substance, that all Courts shall be open,
and every person shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecesary delay, and section 12 provides, in substance, that persons accused of crimes shall have a
speedy public trial.
In Arrowsmith vs. State, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee said:
"A speedy trial within the constitutional
guarantee, means a trial as soon after indictment
as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence
prep~re f?r it, wit~out needless delay, having
1n v1ew 1ts regulattons and conduct by fixed
rules of law."
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People vs. Buckley is a California case wherein
it is said:
"A speedy trial does not mean at once,
but with all convenient dispatch, and implies
courts in which a trial may be had. No doubt it
also implies reasonable time for the state to
provide courts and juries, and to procure witnesses. It imposes, however, a special duty upon
the state with reference to such cases, and, if the
duty is not performed, the prosecution should
be dismissed . . . the mere statement of the
judge that the court has been otherwise engaged
does not show good cause."
The 14th Amendment prohibits any state from
depriving any person of his liberty, except by the procedure provided by the legislature, or other law making
body.
Pursuant to these constitutional provisions, the
legislature enacted the code of criminal procedure, all
of which was adhered to until June the 5th, at which
time the State discovered that its main witness was
absent. The legislature was wise enough to anticipate
such situation and provide a remedy therefor, as
follows:
Section 77-24-18 provides:
"After his plea, the defendant shall be entitled to at least two days to prepare for trial,
but the time of the trial shall not be postponed
for a longer time than the court may deem
imperative."
"Section 77-29-1. When an action is
called for trial, or at any time previous thereto,
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the Court may upon sufficient cause. shown by
either party by affidavit, direct the tnal be postponed to another day of the same or to the
next term. But the Court shall not postpone
the trial for a longer time than may be necessary."
In State vs. Hartman, this Court construed this
section with the following language:
"In the case at bar, no affidavit was made,
oral statements were given in open court, and
the Court ruled: When you seek a continuance
because you haven't got a witness here, it is
necessary that the court pass upon the materiality of the testimony. The testimony must be
material, there must be some showing of that
kind."
In People vs. Buckley it is said:
"No diligence was shown to procure the
attendance of the witness. Certainly the statement of the witness that it would be a hardship to require him to come from Sacramento
was a poor excuse for continuing the case 3 3
days while the defendant was in jail ... The
benefit of this constitutional guarantee cannot
be denied on such flimsy showing.''
After reviewing constitutional and statutory provisions similar to ours, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Finnely vs. State, said:
"A party charged with crime has the costitutional right to a speedy trial, and the Court
has no discretionary power to deny him a right
so important. It was enough for the defendant
to show that the time fixed by the statute after
information filed had expired, and that the cause
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was not postponed on his application. If there
was any cause for holding him for a longer time
:V~~hout trial, it was for the prosecution to show
lt.
In this case, the defendant filed a demand for
trial on April the 3rd, requesting a trial at that term
of Court, but it seemed that the court on its own motion refused the defendant's request and set the trial
for the following term, and in discussing the constitutional requirements in criminal cases, the Court continued:
"The State wholly failed to meet the requirements of a showing that a continuance was
necesary. The burden, under the circumstances,
was upon the State.
"These constitutional and statutory rights
are designed to prevent prosecutions and capricious delavs in criminal trials, in which the accused, whether innocent or guilty, might be
imprisoned or detained under bond indefinitely.
On the other hand these provisions are not designed to hamper the State in the prosecution
of criminal cases. Where no showing for delay
is made by either party the presumption arises
that the delay was necessary or that it was due
to the desire of the accused. But where the accused insists and keeps insisting upon a speedy
trial, without any showing made by the
State justifying a delay, that presumption does
not exist. The adoption of the contrary rule
of judicial construction would render the statutes and constitutional provisions relative to a
speedy trial nugatory."
In State vs. Williams, the defendant filed an affidavit in substance, that he was impecunious and that
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he was unable to proceed to trial without certain witnesses named therein and the court held that such affidavit was not sufficient to meet the requirements of
the statute, stating:
"'The defendant's Affidavit does not, in our
opinion, appear to be of suficient merit to have
justified the court in granting the motion."
In the case at bar, after the appellant's motion in
arrest of judgment had been denied and after the defendant had been sentenced to a term in the State
Prison, the District Attorney appeared in Court and
attempted to justify the record by testifying in substance, that at the time he issued the subpeonas the complaining witness was in Yellowstone park and that by
reason of her absences the State could not proceed. See
(R 116).
It is the position of appellant that such showing
came too late.
In Logan vs. State, it is said:
"'An affidavit for continuance is of no effect when filed after defendant has been tried
and con vic ted.''
We will discuss the sufficiency of this showing in
the next proposition.
In discussing the meaning of the constitution and
statutes similar to ours, the Supreme Court of California in, in re: Begerow, said:
"'It must be remembered that in construing
o.ur declaration of rights there is no presumption that the government or its officers will act
justly, but the contrary. These sections imply
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possible oppression, and are designed to enable
the victim to assert his rights, even as against
the government. The very first section in that
chapter of our constitution asserts that the right
of all men to enjoy and defend, life and liberty
is inalienable. Then follow 12 sections, all
calculated to secure to individuals this right, as
against the government. To the same end, section 13 declares the right to a speedy, public
trial. This certainly has no other function than
to protect those accused of crime against possible delay, caused by wilfull oppression or neglect of the State or its officers. For, no doubt,
persons apprehended upon suspicions have suffered long imprisonment merely because they
were forgotten. The declaration of rights differs from the great English charter, in that it is
not an assurance to the individual from a sovereign, but it is a command and limitation of
power upon the State officials by the people who
created the form of government. Either is a
recognition of the fact, that the State cannot
rightfully hold in prison even an accused person
longer than is necessary that he may be tried,
befo:.:;: L ~al and judgment rendered ...
"It only remains to say that the Statute
does not authorize the state or its officers to
hold an accused person in imprisonment unnessarily, even for 60 days. As already stated,
when the prosecution is begun, the state becomes a party litigant. And as such, must diligently prosecute its case. No unnecessary delay
againt the will of the defendant is to be allowed
to it. The defendant is discharged from
custody."

III
A VOLUNTARY FISHING TRIP ON THE PART OF
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THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN A CRIMINAL CASE
IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR DELAYING THE TRIAL.

It is the contention of the appellant that even had
an affidavit been made as provided by statute, the
facts as evidenced by the record would not constitute
sufficient cause to justify a continuance.
In Hernandez vs. State, the trial court continued
the trial over July and August stating as its reasons
therefor the following:
~'There is now and has been for some 10
or 15 years a rule in this court that no jury
trial shall be held during July and August and
this Court was following the rule of the Court.''

In reversing a conviction had at the trial, and
ordering the defendant discharged, the Supreme Court
of Arizona, said:
HObviously, the good cause shown was the
custom of the Court not to hold jury trial during July and August. Does this satisfy the statute? The question of good cause has been before the courts of many of the states and the decisions are varying. We have found none nor
have we been cited any that are strictly on all
fours with the case at bar. We think, however,
the principal applicable is well stated in the case
of ex parte Caple 58 Miss. 558, as follows; a
judge has no right upon such an issue to consult
the desires or interests of particular classes of
the community, so long as there remains one
prisoner in custody who demands to be tried
not even to subordinate the right of the impris~
oned to the mere wishes of the entire community. There must be some grave public ne-
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cessity to warrant the prolongation in confinement of those who demand a speedy trial which
the constitution guarantees the humblest citizen.
"No rule or custom of court can set aside
a positive statute, especially when it involves
the protection of a constitutional right conferred
upon the individual citizen.tt
Neven vs. Neven, is a Nevada case, wherein the
defendant in a divorce action was also the guardian in
a matter pending in another court. The trial in the
action was a divorce proceeding pending in the District
Court at Reno, and on the date set for the trial, the
defendant's attorney made an application for a continuance based upon his affidavit stating that the deendant was in Elko, Nevada, looking after the guardianship of his ward in the courts up there, and also
that a delay in train service made it impossible for
him to reach court in Reno in time for trial, and in
discussing the good cause necessary to sustain a continuance, the Supreme Court of Nevada, said:
"A party who is a material witness in his
own behalf must have his testimony ready for
use at the trial unless prevented from doing so
by some obstacle which by the exercise of reasonable diligence he cannot overcome, and the obstacle should not be one which he has created by
his own voluntary act. If he allows consideration of business or pleasure or even regard his
own health to call him away for a time when
his suit is liable to be called for trial and thereby loses the benefit of his own testimony he
must suffer the consequences. A party must be
held to the exercise of good faith and diligence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

and cannot be heard to complain if the failure
to present his case results from an attem~t
to subordinate the business of the Court to h1s
own business engagements and convenience."
In Taylor vs. State, the court granted the defendant one hour in which to prepare a formal application
for a continuance, and the attorney failed to prepare
such an affidavit on. the ground that he had other business pending in another court at the time and was
not able to prepare the necessary application within
one hour, and the Oklahoma Court held that the business of the attorney in another court was not sufficient
cause to grant a continuance.
During the trial of the cause at bar, on cross-examination of the prosecutrix, beginning at ( R 56) ,
the following took place:

Q.
A.
stone.

Where were you on June 5th?
That was the day we were in Yellow-

Q.

When did you go to Yellowstone?

A.

The previous Saturday.

9· . Did you advise the County Attorney
or D1stnct Attorney that you were leaving
town?
A.

No sir, I did not.

Q. What was your purpose for going
to Yellowstone?
A. Just to rest and relax and fish· Jim
was going up there on business.
'
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The Court: You have that as an objection to all of the evidence.
Mr. Oliver: Yes.
Mr. Ronow: What this Witness does or
does not do has nothing to do with the setting
of cases; I could not reach her with a supeona.
The Court: Over-ruled.
It is quite clear that had a showing been made
by the prosecuting attorney on June 5th, that showing would have revealed what appears in this testimony, that the witness voluntarily left the State to go
on a fishing tr~p to Yellowstone Park, and such a
showing would not have been sufficient cause to justify a continuance under the la'v cited above.
State vs. Bre·wer is a Utah case, wherein the case
was called for a trial on June 21st, at which time the
defendant interposed a motion for a continuance supported by affidavit, claiming that a material witness
lived outside the State and that he had used every possible mea~~ ~ . ..1 :~:urc the p~·:.:s:nces of said witness at
the trial. The court over-ruled the defendant's motion
and upon appeal this Court said:
"The record shows that the Court on May
1st. made an order setting the case for trial. No
claim \\ras made that defendant and his counsel
were not advised of this order at the time it
was made. The court over-ruled the motion for
a continuance. On June 21st, the case was again
called for trial and the defendant interposed
another motion for a continuance. supported by
affidavit in which he reiterated the facts set
forth in the former affidavit. The Court over-
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ruled the motion. This ruling is assigned as error. As stated, it is not claimed, and the rec'?r~
does not, show, that defendant used any dihgence whatever to procure the attendance of the
witness. Moreover, when the defendant was
testifying in his own behalf, stated on cross-e:camination that he never wrote a letter to the Witness· never received a letter from her; never
sent' a telegram to her; never received a telegram
from her, as stated in his affidavit."
This case affirmatively holds that a showing of
due diligence is required by affidavit before a continuance is justified under the statute above quoted.
In the case at bar (R 56) the record shows that
the complaining witness left town for Yellowstone
Park on the Saturday previous to June 5th, which
was June the 1st. At (R 6) the record also shows that
on May 17th, this cause was set for trial for June 11th
in turn. Thereafter, and in conformity with the rules
and general practice of the Court, the clerk set the
case definitely for trial on June 5th, and notified the
respective counsel thereof on May 21. This advised counsel of such setting at least 15 days prior
to the time the trial was to begin, and notwithstanding this notice the record does not disclose, and the
prosecuting attorney does not claim that he made any
effort whatsoever to notify or otherwise inform the
witnesses of this trial until June 4th, when a subpeona
was issued. There was at least 10 days prior to June
1st, when this particular witness was in the jurisdiction of the court and subject to supeona and nowhere
in the record is there any showing of any kind indicating any reason whatsoever for not notifying this
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witness that trial was set for June 5th, and t-:quiring
her presence, and in this we respectfully submit that
the State has wholly and completely failed to 1 ake any
showing of diligence or otherwise to justify ' continuance over the objection of the defendant, and certainly the statute does not vest in the Court ar 1 power
of discretion or authority to continue a trial without· ,
the showing required by the statute.
Arrowsmith vs. State, is a Tennessee case wherein
the defendant was charged on several indictments of
several separate and distinct crimes and upon the conviction of one, the Court made the following order:
~~Came the attorney general for the state,
and, it appearing to the court that defendant is
serving a term in the penetentiary, it is considered by the court that said cases be retired
from the docket until the expiration of said
sentence.''
In reversing a conviction on the second trial, the
Tennessee Supreme Court, said:
"The penetentiary is not a place of sanctuary, and an incarcerated convict ought not to
enjoy the immunity from trial merely because
he is undergoing punishment on ·some other
judgment of guilt. Why sholil<fthere be a delay in bringing him to trial on an indictment
pending against him, a convict who has not yet
completed the service of a previous sentence? No
reason can be suggested for such delay in the
case of a convict adjudged guilty of some other
offense and actually in execution of a sentence
thereunder that does not apply equally to an
individual who has been indicted, but has not
yet been tried.''
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Sta:te vs. Keefe, is a Wyoming case, wherein syllabus 10 r~-ads as follows:
·,rr

''Under revised statute 18 9 9, sections 53 8 2
ahH 53 8 3 requiring accused persons to be tried
within specified times, accused imprisonment
ir( tthe penitentiary for another offense does not
excuse a delay in prosecution."
In State vs. Hartman, this Court held that the
deendant had not shown diligence, and in State vs.
Fairclough, that the absence of defendant's main attorney in the trial of another cause does not constitute
good cause for delay.
In Musgraves vs. State, it is said:
"No reason is given why process was not
procured for the witness at an earlier date. The
law requires diligence in these matters. A defendant cannot sit still and wait until just before his trial before he begins to get ready for
trial. He must be diligent.
It just happens, in the case at bar, that the shoe
is on the other foot.
Back in the territorial days of this state in the
case of People vs. Flynn, this Court held that imprisonment is no excuse for delay of a trial in a criminal case.
CONCLUSION
We have shown, herein, the procedure provided
by the legislature for the trial of criminal cases in U tab;
we have shown wherein those rules were not followed
or obeyed in the trial in this cause; we have shown
that business of counsel in another court is not good
cause for delaying a criminal trial; that imprisonment
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of defendant is no good cause for delay; that negligence
in securing witnesses is not good cause for delay, that
the custom of the court in not trying cases in the summer time is not good cause for delay; and that the private business or pleasure of a party to the action is not
good cause for delay. We have also shown wherein the
State failed to make any showing whatsoever at the
time it requested a continuance and that the showing attempted to be made after trial, conviction and sentence,
was untimely and too late. Assuming for the sake of argument, that such showing was timely, we have shown
wherein it does not measure up to the standards of
diligence and good cause required by law, and in this
we respectfully submit, that if the delay in the trial
of this case can be justified by the urge of the prosecutrix to relax and fish, then the legislature acted in
vain in enacting Sections 77-24-18 and 77-29-1 of the
penal code; that all of the decisions of the Courts of
Last Resort in construing similar statutes have been
written for little purpose and both our State and Federal Constitutions have become as sounding brass and
tinkling cymbals.
In this we respectfully submit that the conviction
in this case should be reversed with directions to discharge the appellant and dismiss the information.
Respectfully submitted,

D. H.

OLIVER

Attorney for Appellant
3 09 Frick Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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